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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
A trending tendency in the agricultural market the last couple of years have created a large 
demand for organic agricultural products. With the demand for organic products, more and 
more farmers have converted to organic farming. Organic farming is a somewhat young 
ideology created in the wakes of late 70’s environmentalism and the destructive ways of 
agriculture overproduction. We have then been wondering how well is the organic 
agricultural farming represented within the bureaucracy of the EU. 
        The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the European Union (EU) is a very special 
legislative policy within the EU. The CAP was invented to create a harmonized agricultural 
marked for farmers in the EU and was created in 1962, as a reaction to the poor 
agricultural production and economy following the war. Subsidies where given to farmers 
corresponding to the amount of agricultural goods they could produce. Over time however 
this lead to the CAP becoming ever more expensive. In 1984 the CAP’s budget was 70 
percent of the EU budget and some of the many critics of the CAP believe that the 
subsidies were uneven distributed to farmers, and the CAP creates an artificial marked of 
agriculture product creating overflow wares without a demand (Staab, 2008), (Sorrentino, 
Henke and Severini, 2011). 
        However action where taken in 1992 through the “McSharry reforms” of the CAP. 
Where a decoupling of the payments from production would occur. Many believe that 
these reforms marked the birth of the “modern cap” which is why we want to scrutinize this 
reform and try to estimate if it was a “radical” reform, and just how much it changed the 
CAP.  
        The Treaty of Lisbon in 2008 introduced a new dimension of lobbying at the 
European level that is different from the national level where lobbyist try to influence 
politicians in given countries (Hauser 2011). With the expansion of the EU, legislations and 
involvement of EU law in national politics the lobbyism have moved to EU for influence. 
Lobbyism already have a rumor for being a hidden undemocratic actor in politics. We 
believe that the suspicion of this, whether it is true or not, will be enlarged by the relocation 
to Brussel. Since the Lisbon treaty in 2008 the European parliament went from being a 
consultative institution in regards to decision making towards the CAP to a co-decisive 
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institution, we expect that this will have had some outcome in regard to the influence by 
lobbyist pressure from various interest groups. This reformation of the institutional setup 
surrounding the CAP gives lobbyism more broad possibilities to influence. The influence 
by lobbyism were partly confirmed with the latest reformation of the CAP in 2013, where 
there were focus on environmentalism (European Commission, 2013). With lobbyism 
moving from the respective countries to a broader and more complex domain of EU 
institutionalism, we also fear that there will be a loss of democracy and transparency. This 
was one of our reasons for our own interest in the project. 
We ask, will the powers of the free market be enough to let organic farming have its place 
in the artificial food marked in the shadow of bureaucratic settings of the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy. Or do the organic farmers have to involve themselves politically to 
claim their right to work and live by their own ideology? 
1.2 Problem area 
Since the MacSharry reform in 1992, organic farming has been a part of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The regulation at the time made it obligatory for nation states to 
implement an agri-environmental scheme. Particular emphasis was put on the wish for 
increasing support for organic production in the agricultural industry. However, no clear 
political goal for the organic agricultural sector exists at this point. Compared to other 
environmental sectors such as renewable energy which have a clear 2020 plan, none 
exists to support the future market shares for the organic farmers of Europe (Svendsen 
2011 p.35). 
        Historically organic farming developed as a critique to conventional farming and the 
existing farming practices, fundamentally wishing to change the way of production. 
However, organic farming works in the same context of conventional farming; they both 
operate in the food market, within the context of agricultural policy but also in a community 
of farmers’ organizations. Since the European food market is not only a subject to market 
forces, but are heavily influenced by “market disruptions” such as fixed prices on important 
agricultural goods most European farmers depend on the subsidies distributed from the 
Common Agricultural Policy. Because of this, we believe that the relationship between the 
politicians, the institutions of the EU and the European farmers is worthy of analysis.  
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Consequently, we speculate that the evolution of the agricultural sector is closely related to 
the institutional setting that it operates within and not just the market forces steering 
production. (Lynggard; The farmer within an institutional environment p.85) 
        As it stands today, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union 
divides its subsidies to the agricultural production through two pillars. The first one with the 
far biggest budget is aimed directly at the farmer, and the size of the support corresponds 
to the amount of land he/she owns, as well as socio-economic dimensions, which will be 
elaborated later on. The second pillar provides more layers to the CAP. One of the 
important aspects is that it seeks to promote better incentive to farm green or organic 
through development of the organic sector.  Generally, it promotes rural development in 
the member states.                        
         Since 1992 and the birth of the modern CAP more funds have been transferred from 
the first pillar to the second but the amount of money given to the member states through 
this second pillar is still a relatively small amount compared to pillar one. 
The structure of the CAP provides us with a point of inquiry. Why aren’t more funds 
transferred to the second pillar, which consequently could provide a better incentive to be 
an organic farmer? In times where the European Union takes the responsibility of moving 
its citizens towards a cleaner environment, in this case food market, as well as the fact that 
European consumers wanting more ecological wares is becoming increasingly evident, 
this seems like the logical thing to do. Whereas the political process for increased aid to 
the green farmers, have been under way for more than twenty years the question remains 
if the regulations to the CAP have been ambitious enough. If not, what factors has halted 
the process? 
          As stated earlier, the organic farmer acts in accordance to the food market, the 
institutional setting and in a community of farmers’ organizations. The analysis of this 
paper on the above mentioned problem area will consequently revolve around how the 
organic farmer organizes him/her self to put pressure for increased amounts of reform 
through the process of lobbying. We will look at how this is formulated at the European 
level. Consequently, how and to what degree they are able to put pressure on CAP 
legislation. Consequently, this leads us to our research question: 
To what degree are the organic farmers’ interest groups in the European Union able 
to create political pressure? 
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1.3 Working Questions 
In order to formulate a feasible argument concerning the above mentioned research 
question we have chosen to adopt the following sub-questions. 
How has the policy legacy of the MacSharry reform from 1992 affected future CAP 
reforms? 
This will be analyzed by using the two concepts path dependence and policy networks. 
-       How are organic farmers organized at the European level? 
This layer of analysis will serve to illuminate the actors involved in the process. 
-       How do the interest groups engage in lobby activities in the EU? 
This layer of analysis will serve as the main tool for answering our hypothesis. The 
process in itself should provide empirical material, which our theoretical framework will 
utilize to provide a base of evidence. 
-    What is the relation between the European institutions and organic 
farming interest groups, and how does this influence the CAP? 
1.4 Description 
In order for this project to examine CAP, the institutions involved and the how interest 
groups seek influence, the research project are to answer:” To what degree are the 
organic farmers’ interest groups in the European Union able to create political pressure?” 
This section presents the structure of the project and how the different areas the project 
touch upon are intertwined. The research project is structured into 6 chapters, which will 
be presented. 
         The first chapter is the introduction. This chapter provides the reader with the 
background information of the project and why an examination of CAP is relevant. The 
problem area is explained in order to present the case of analysis, which is the 
comparative case study on organic farming and the wind turbine industry. The working 
question is presented and explained.  
        The second chapter is the methodological approach, where the research approach of 
the project is elaborated and explains the choice of the neo-positivist approach, which the 
project uses in order to answer aforementioned working question and reach conclusion. 
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The chapter explains the choice of methods used and elaborates the choice of 
comparative case study as well as an examination of the selected sources. 
        Chapter three engages with the theoretical approach, where it argues the projects 
use of new institutionalism, path dependency as well as the choice of policy network, 
which will construct the basis of the project analytical framework. 
         The fourth chapter of the project is the descriptive section of the project. It describes 
the CAP reform in order to understand this area within the EU and the importance of this 
reform as well as the implications there are in order to reform this policy. It will mainly 
explain the 1992 reform, because this reform is argued to have changed CAP most 
radically. The following part examines the institutions involved in the policy making of CAP, 
and how these different actors interact in order for a policy to be implemented. Lobbyism 
will thereafter be examined. The project is to illuminate how interest organizations interact 
with the European institutions in order to seek influence in regards to CAP. The interest 
groups, which this project focuses on, are mainly the Committee of Professional 
Agricultural Organizations (COPA) and the International Federation of Organic Agricultural 
Movements EU Group (IFOAM EU Group) in order to understand the influence of the 
larger interest groups in regards to the agricultural aspect of the EU. 
Furthermore, this section will investigate these interest groups further by introducing the 
concept of policy networks, where the project examines the relationship between 
governments, EU directorate generals and the interest groups and how these actors 
exchange information. A transition from policy networks to the concept of path dependency 
will be made, where path dependency examines the historical decisions made within the 
CAP and how these past decision influence present decisions made. The concept of path 
dependency is an essential part for this project because of the link to the theory on new 
institutionalism. Policy networks and path dependency are then to be applied to the 1992 
reform of CAP and analyzed the outcome of this policy and the decision making involved. 
          Chapter 5 is the analytical section of the project. A case on the organic farming 
within the EU is examined, where the project analyses the implications of organic farming 
in context to the wind turbine industry. This part links the aforementioned areas the project 
has examined in order to explain to what degree the organic farmers’ interest groups in the 
European Union are able to create political pressure. It does this by implementing the 
concepts of path dependency of policy network. 
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The last chapter, the sixth chapter, concludes the projects finding, and concludes the 
research question of the project. 
Chapter 2 
Methodological Approach  
This chapter of the research project is to explain, which method, research approach, and 
the choice of sources and empirical data the project uses in order to answer the 
aforementioned research question. The first section of this chapter focuses on the projects 
use of positivism as the research approach and explains how the use of positivism is the 
tool used to examine the institutions and lobbyism within the EU. The second part explains 
the method used, where the project has chosen a comparative case study analysis, where 
the CAP reform is examined as well as a case on the organic and conventional farmers 
influence in the EU institutions. The third section focuses on the empirical data and 
sources the project has used in order to reach the conclusion. 
2.1 Research Approach 
This research project has applied the neo-positivist research approach in order to answer 
the research question of the project. The neo-positivist research approach is a further 
development from the positivist approach, which argues that knowledge exists 
independent of the observer and that there is a natural law within social science and 
therefore argues for a truth on a certain social phenomena (Delanty and Strydom, 2003 
pg. 14). In regards to neo-positivism different theories have been inspired by this approach 
such rational choice theory within political science as well as realism within political 
science. This projects use of new institutionalism especially in context to rational – and 
historical institutionalism, which has similar ties to rational choice theory, therefore makes 
the projects use of neo-positivism an obvious research approach (Cini and Borragán, 2013 
pg. 90). 
Neo-positivism argues the social world as being one-layered and thereby has its roots in 
natural science, where the social world such be seen as a unified science based on a 
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series of assumptions (Delanty and Strydom, 2003 pg. 14). This project has therefore 
applied this approach in order to explain the decision making process within EU by using 
the theory of new institutionalism and the concepts such as path dependency and policy 
networks. The project conducts its research from a deductive logic, where it will test the 
aforementioned theory on the gathered empirical material in order to prove causality. The 
deductive approach is a process where the research project formulate a research question 
in this case the research question is ”to what degree are the organic farmers’ interest 
groups in the European Union able to create political pressure?” The project is to apply 
theory to concrete cases in order to test what causes causality. Neo-positivism on the 
basis of the research question develops a hypothesis, where this research are to test the 
hypothesis that the organic farmers organizations have has greater difficulties to influence 
decision making outcomes compared with the conventional farmers organizations. The 
project will therefore be based on its empirical observations examine and analyze these 
results in order confirm or refuse the aforementioned hypothesis in order to answer the 
research question of the project (Hesse-Bieber and Leavy, 2011 pg. 8-9). 
        Thus, this approach often is used in quantitative research; this project has chosen to 
use this deductive logic in regards to a qualitative research in context to its methodological 
framework. This is done by applying the approach to different cases of the EU in order to 
test the hypothesis. This will be explained in the following section on which method this 
project uses. 
2.2 Methods – case study.      
This section engages with the method of the project and how this research project has 
chosen to use method. Case study is distinguished from other research methods, because 
it is a decision of what to be studied (Hesse-Bieber and Leavy, 2011 pg. 255). Case study 
is therefore no methodological decision but a decision of what to be studied. A case study 
can therefore be conducted from a broad field of theoretical approaches and is a study that 
is seen an exploration from multiple perspectives (Hesse-Bieber and Leavy, 2011 pg. 
255). 
        This project uses case study in order to provide a holistic understanding in regards to 
how interest organizations and the institutions of EU influence the policy outcomes, where 
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it is necessary for this project to examine this political context from multiple perspectives. It 
therefore aims to test the aforementioned theory of use to understand the case, which is 
studied. The project aims for an empirical generalization on the basis of the multiple cases 
studied, which will be done by the use of a qualitative approach in order examine the 
political context (Hesse-Bieber and Leavy, 2011 pg. 256). It is therefore important when 
examining the political context of the case to be aware of the choice of issues, the context 
and triangulate the cases to obtain objectivity. 
         This case study will be constructed in order to holistically understand the particular 
case of the interest groups within the EU by examine multiple cases to understand the 
complexity of lobbying and decision making within the EU. The use of case study will 
thereby provide the project to generalize through comparative analysis, which will be done 
by examining published studies to reach generalizability (Hesse-Bieber and Leavy, 2011 
pg. 256). This use of case study is often used in neo-positivist research, which is the 
research approach of this research project (Hesse-Bieber and Leavy, 2011 pg. 261). 
This project focuses on an analysis of gathered empirical materials from other independent 
studies and applies these observations on the theory of new institutionalism as well as 
path dependence and policy networks to examine how the organic farmers is organized at 
a European level in order to analyze relation between the EU institutions and the organic 
farmers organizations. The research relies therefore on secondary sources. The choice of 
sources and selection of such will be explained the following section, where the project 
explains the empirical data it uses. 
2.3 Selection of Sources 
The data used in this project in order to analyze the working questions of the project in 
regards to the analysis of the comparative case study relies on secondary sources. The 
empirical material, which this research project uses, is therefore gathered from various 
journal articles and books on especially lobbying and the EUs institutions. The book by 
Justin Greenwood “Interest Representation in the European Union” provides the project 
with knowledge on the organization of interest groups within the EU and how these 
different interest groups operate in order to obtain influence at a European level.  
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Because this project investigates the CAP by the use of path dependency in order to 
examine CAP from a historical institutionalist point of view, the scholar Adrian Key 
provides the project with his interpretation and insight in how path dependency can explain 
the historical aspect of CAP. The empirical evidence of the project is therefore gathered 
empirical material from various scholars of European studies. In order for this project to 
understand the agendas from the different interest groups as well as reforms on CAP by 
the European Union, the project examines reports from IFOAM EU Group, EWEA and 
Europe.eu. It is therefore important for this project to be aware of the authors of these 
report and the origins of the reports in order to present reliable arguments throughout the 
project and thereby triangulate in order to provide a holistic approach. The project consists 
therefore on qualitative secondary sources and some primary sources from different 
reports from the European Union, IFOAM EU Group and EWEA that will provide the 
project the necessary information on the resources, which these interest groups possess 
as well as the objectives of CAP. Because of the large use of secondary sources, the 
project has to be aware of reliability and validity of the material used in order to obtain 
objectivity. This has been done by examining in which journals the various articles has 
been published which enables the project to be aware certain bias the article used might 
have. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical approach 
The theoretical approach of the research project will be explained in this section. The 
section elaborates the choice of theory and the different concepts, which will form the 
basis of analysis, thereby enables the project to answer the aforementioned working 
questions, and thereby enables to reach conclusion of the research question “To what 
degree are the organic farmers’ interest groups in the European Union able to create 
political pressure?” Because the project has chosen to examine the institutions involved in 
decision-making and how lobbying at the European level works, the project choses to 
analyze this from a historical institutionalist approach where the concept of path 
dependence is a relevant factor in order to analyze the institutions from a historical 
institutionalist approach. Policy network will provide the analysis with the knowledge of 
how interest groups organize and use its resources in order obtain influence.  
3.1 New institutionalism 
The theoretical approach of the project will be provided on based on the theory of new 
institutionalism, where the project has chosen historical institutionalism in order to examine 
the institutions of the EU. This approach within the studies of institutions focus on an 
asymmetrical power relation, where the objectives of actors will be transformed which 
result in an institutional influence on the decision making process (Saurugger, 2014 pg. 
91). The historical institutionalism is therefore uses in context to the CAP reforms, where 
the project examines the historical institutional influence in regards to the MacSharry 
reform of 1992. This approach is often applied in regards to policy case studies, which also 
is the case of this project. This institutionalist approach argues that actors are not in 
control of the consequences of their actions, because the respective institutions influence 
the political context of the policy outcome (Saurugger, 2014 pg. 91). When the theoretical 
approach of historical institutionalism forms the basis of the analysis, the concept of path 
dependence is a central aspect of historical institutionalism. 
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3.2 Path dependence 
In context to the use of historical institutionalism path dependence has an essential role in 
order to explain how institutions influence the decision making process. The concept of 
path dependence is an important tool for this project in order to analyze the Maastricht 
reform of 1992 in regards to CAP, where this concept will enable the project to illuminate 
how decisions made in the past have historical importance in regards to decisions made in 
the present (Saurugger, 2014 pg. 91). In regards to the use of comparative case study 
path dependence will be applied in order to analyze whether or not lobbyism has changed 
because of the transition from consolation to co-decision within the decision making 
process of the EU, where path dependence can be an essential concept for analysis. This 
concept can therefore explain if histories past decisions have had an impact or if a critical 
juncture within the institution setup has taken place. 
3.3 Policy Networks 
In context to the projects use of historical institutionalism and path dependency, the 
research project applies the concept of policy networks in order to illuminate the influence 
of interest organizations. This approach will be applied in the analysis to examine how the 
actors in regards to interest organizations create structural relationships to exchange 
resources (Daugbjerg, 1999). The use of policy networks will therefore enable the project 
to analyze the informal policymaking at an EU level, in regards to the comparative case 
study on the organic farmers and the wind turbine industry. This approach to the interest 
organizations creates a platform for analysis in context to why and how certain actors 
benefit from policy influence, and the importance of resources and organizational structure 
of an interest organization.    
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3.4 Non-theoretical Concepts 
Rural development 
This policy reserved to the second pillar of the subsidies is responsible in addressing the 
challenges faced by rural areas and to unlock their potential. It addresses three key areas. 
Improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry sector. Bettering the 
environment and the countryside, improving the quality of life in rural areas and 
encouraging diversification of the rural economy. The rural development policy is 
implemented and co-financed by the member state. Therefore, it is important to note that it 
is not exactly the same outcome of policy across the continent.                     
                                 
Organic farming 
The definition by the IFOAM goes as follows. 
"Organic Agriculture is a production system that sustains the health of soils, ecosystems 
and people. It relies on ecological processes, biodiversity and cycles adapted to local 
conditions, rather than the use of inputs with adverse effects. Organic Agriculture 
combines tradition, innovation and science to benefit the shared environment and promote 
fair relationships and a good quality of life for all involved."(http://www.ifoam.bio) The 
method of farming developed as a reaction to conventional farming seeking in particular to 
avoid use of chemically produced pesticides. This is referred to as “inputs” in the quote 
above. This project will be adapting IFOAM’s definition of organic farming. 
3.5 New institutionalism 
In order to understand the institutions within EU, different theories can explain the 
decisions made by these various institutions. This project has chosen the theory of 
institutionalism in order to examine the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). Institutionalism 
or new institutionalism can be divided into three types of institutionalism – rational choice-, 
historical- and sociological institutionalism. This project will examine the institutions in 
regards to CAP by applying the historical institutionalism in order to explain how history 
and path-dependence shapes decisions made within the institutions of the EU. Before the 
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explanation of the impacts of the historical institutionalist approach, this project will briefly 
cover rational – and sociological institutionalist approaches. 
         New institutionalist argues that institutions matter and should be viewed as shapers 
of actor behavior (Cini and Borragán, 2013, pg. 90). Therefore new institutionalists would 
argue that institutions becomes actors of own interest and therefore do not function as an 
agent acting on behalf of member states, but from their preferences on the basis of their 
own interests (Cini and Borragán, 2013, pg. 90). By taken the point of departure of new 
institutionalism in regards to the CAP reforms, it is interesting to examine in whose 
interests these reforms has been formulated. The most dominant approach within 
institutionalism is the rational choice institutionalism. This approach to institutionalism 
argues, “Institutions in this account are both modifiers of the pursuit of self-interest and a 
medium through which actors may conduct their transactions with greater efficiency (Cini 
and Borragán, 2013, pg. 90).” This is therefore in the same tradition as rational choice 
theory where humans are self-seeking and behave rationally – In this case the institutions 
act accordingly to rational choice theory. This means that institutions affect how actors, for 
example member states, pursue their own preferences. An interesting aspect in regards to 
this, is that rational choice institutionalist as well as historical institutionalist see interests 
external to interaction while sociological institutionalist see them as internal. This means 
that the sociological institutionalists argue that interests are the product of social 
interaction between actors (Cini and Borragán, 2013, pg. 92). The sociological 
institutionalist will therefore argue that the culture of institutions is important and that the 
institutions themselves have an understanding of what their context is and do not only 
affect the strategic calculations of individuals as rational choice institutionalists do. When 
the sociological institutionalists say that interests are endogenous to interactions, they 
argue that European norms will affect and be adapted to the political cultures of the 
European member states Cini and Borragán, 2013, pg. 93). 
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3.6 Historical institutionalism 
The third approach developed within new institutionalism is historical institutionalism. This 
way of analysing the institutions explain that “history is important and creates the context 
which shapes the choices of actors (Lasan, 2012 pg. 77).” This approach of 
institutionalism this project is examining further in regards to the Common Agricultural 
Policy. Hall and Taylor explain that historical institutionalism can be divided into three main 
features (Lasan, Hall and Taylor, 2012 pg. 78). 
         The first characteristic within historical institutionalism states that historical 
institutionalist are divided into two camps, where the first camp of historical institutionalists 
are closer to the rational institutionalism, where institutions are argued as rational actors, 
and therefore acts as strategic interactors as before mentioned (Lasan, 2012 pg. 78). The 
second camp has closer ties towards sociological institutionalism and therefore acts with a 
more cultural perspective. This means that this camp of historical institutionalists argue 
that institutions have to been viewed as providing moral for interpretation and action 
(Lasan, 2012 pg. 78). Historical institutionalism can in this sense be viewed as a big 
theoretical concept where both camps can be able to provide insight of a given problem. 
Historical institutionalism will argue that both the rational – and the sociological 
institutionalism are to shape the political outcome in strategies and the goals of certain 
actors within the institutional context (Lasan, 2012 pg. 78). 
         The second characteristic concerns how institutions distribute power between social 
groups, where the power is not always equally distributed and how these actors shape the 
institutions to their own preferences, which will make certain actors more powerful than 
others (Lasan, 2012 pg. 78). The third feature within historical institutionalism addresses 
the concept of path-dependence. This refers to the historical development. In regards to 
CAP path-dependence, it is interesting, because historical institutionalists argue that 
history matters and earlier reforms will always influence future decisions. This process is 
referred to as lock-in, which generally means that the institutional environment has already 
been set, which has the effect that actors will act on the premises of the institutional setup. 
In regards to how history matters the theory of “Critical Junctures” by Giovanni Capoccia 
and R. Daniel Kelemen are to be used in regards to explaining the choices, which has 
been made when reforming the CAP. The concept of critical junctures is essential to 
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historical institutionalism. Critical junctures are the basis and the premise of path-
dependence and constitute the starting point of this process (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007 
pg. 342). The definition of critical junctures by Capoccia and Kelemen is; “In the context of 
the study of path-dependent phenomena, we define critical junctures as relatively short 
periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' 
choices will affect the outcome of interest (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007 pg. 348)”. In 
relations to the Common Agricultural Policy, the two junctures within the timeline of the 
CAP have had essential importance of the policy outcomes. These are the reforms in 1960 
and 1992, which will be explained further in the analysis. When examining the CAP one 
could argue that, the development of a policy could be viewed as a “punctual equilibrium” 
path, which means that critical junctures set the policy until a new critical juncture occurs 
and thereby sets a new path (Lasan, 2012 pg. 82). 
        It is therefore important when examining historical institutionalism, in regards to the 
EU and in this case the CAP, not only to focus on path-dependence. Paul Pierson argues 
that path-dependence does not only concern on the fact that history matters. It has to be 
viewed as how political processes entail trajectories, which are difficult to reverse (Bulmer: 
Pierson, 2009 pg. 310). The concept of historical institutionalism will thereby be one of the 
concepts, which this project is to use when analyzing CAP and the historical context of 
CAP. The project will therefore examine the 1992 reform in regards to CAP and examine 
how and why this reform is argued to be a critical juncture and a fundamental change 
within the policy of CAP 
         To exercise influence in the policy making process it is the only way to gain access 
to an EU institution, it is up to the specific interest group to make a cost benefit analysis 
where to put the interest group effort (Bouwen 2001, p. 2). Very few interest groups have 
the abilities to influence at many levels. To combat mistrust of the public, and remove fear 
of corruption. 
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Chapter 4 
Theoretical framework 
This section of the research project describes CAP as an institution and the decision 
making process within the EU. These are essential element in order to understand how 
lobbying at a European level works. An introduction to lobbying is conducted in order 
understand the basic element of lobbying at the European level. This section will therefore 
apply the concepts of path dependency and policy networks on CAP in order to illuminate 
how these concepts can explain CAP and the lobbying within European institutions. The 
MacSharry reform from 1992 will be examined by the use of path dependency and policy 
networks to explain the change within CAP.  
4.1 The institutions involved within the policy 
formulation on CAP 
This section of the research project will explain and elaborate on the institutions within the 
European Union involved in the policy making of the Common Agricultural policy (CAP). In 
order to answer the research question: “ To what degree are the organic farmers’ interest 
groups in the European Union able to create political pressure?” the institutions has an 
essential role in order to understand how reforms such as the CAP are formulated and 
implemented as well as how the interest organizations influence the policy formulation. 
When examining how a reform such as the CAP is implemented different actors within the 
EU are in play. Policy making in the EU is argued to be a circular process with five policy 
stages (Cini and Borragán, 2013 pg. 200). These five policy steps are agenda setting, 
policy formulation, decision-making, policy implementation and policy evaluation. The 
agenda setting can come from a broad range of places such as member states, public 
agenda or ongoing issues. When the agenda has been set, the Commission will formulate 
a proposal or a draft, which they will deliver to a first reading by the European Parliament, 
who will then amend the proposal from the Commission and sent it to the Council. The 
council is then to approve the EP’s amendments or propose further amendments, where 
the proposal will be sent back to the EP for a second reading. Without going into broader 
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details on the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) this process can proceed for three 
readings, where the act either will be adopted or rejected (Cini and Borragán, 2013 pg. 
205). Though this process may sound complex the given policy are usually approved in 
the first reading or the early second reading. 
       The aforementioned legislative procedure the OLP is a relatively new legislative 
process, which came about in 2009 with the Lisbon Treaty (Cini and Borragán, 2013 pg. 
201). Therefore when examining the CAP the formal decision making process in a 
historical perspective has been different compared to the aforementioned procedure where 
the EP has gained more power and influence in regards to amendments to the CAP 
reforms. This project, which examines the 1992 reform on the CAP, which some argue to 
be the most fundamental change within the CAP, will elaborate further on the formal 
decision making process (Lasan, 2012 pg. 78). 
        The main actor in the CAP decision-making process has been the Commission and 
the Agricultural Council (Cini and Borragán, 2013 pg. 311). The amendments to the 
proposal have been made by the Agricultural Council, where expert information is given by 
the predatory body of the Special Committee for Agriculture (SCA). SCA collects the 
information and proposals from the working groups that deals with agricultural aspects as 
well as the main interest group on agriculture the Committee of Professional Agricultural 
Organizations (COPA) (Cini and Borragán, 2013 pg. 311). This project will therefore look 
further into the influence of COPA and other interest groups on agriculture such as the 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), which is argued as 
one of the only relevant organic farming organisation at an EU level (Moschitz and Stolze, 
2007 pg. 38). These groups will be elaborated on in the next section. 
        The difficulties with reforming the CAP has been, because of the formal rule of 
qualified majority voting (QMV) within the Agricultural Council, where there often is not 
consensus across all member states (Cini and Borragán, 2013 pg. 311). This can result in 
a long process and slow down the pace of the reform, because each member state have 
been able to veto a decision made on reforming the CAP (Cini and Borragán, 2013 pg. 
311). Historically this has been one of the most essential reasons as to why the CAP has 
been such a difficult area to make radical changing reform. 
        In the following section, we will sum up the main reasons behind the 1992 MacSharry 
reform. Next, we will go through what the reform contains and why it was significant. 
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Finally, we will make a summary of the following reforms leading to the present time. This 
should provide the reader with comprehension of the area in which our project takes place. 
4.2 1986 GATT: Uruguay Round 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), what would later be expanded to 
the WTO we know today, was a multilateral agreement regulating international trade. Its 
main purpose was the substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers. 
The 1986 round held in Uruguay, was the most ambitious round to date. So far, agriculture 
had been exempted from agreements as it was given special status in import quotas and 
export subsidies. However, by the time of the Uruguay round several countries, which 
came to be known as the “Cairns group”, namely composed by small and medium sized 
agricultural exporters such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil and Canada refused to sign a 
new deal without a radical liberalization of international agricultural markets. Supported by 
the United States they put heavy pressure on the European Community to reform the 
CAP, which the US denounced as a system that allowed European farmers to eschew 
competition with the rest of the world, and generating trade distortions for farmers in non-
EU countries. The EU, backed by traditionally more protectionist countries such as Norway 
and Japan found itself on the defensive. 
       By 1990, the European Union and the United States were still in conflicting positions 
leading to a stalemate in the process. In order to increase pressure on the Europeans, the 
Americans and their allies decided not to negotiate any other aspect of the trade 
agreement round until the issue regarding EU´s agricultural price support were resolved. 
This crisis in the GATT arena provided an opportunity for European pro-CAP reformers. By 
now, a reform was seen as the only solution. The European Commission delivered such a 
reform for the Agricultural Council in February 1991, using its right of initiative for the first 
time in CAP history. (EU book, p.313) 
In the following section, we will summarize the general contents of the Common 
Agricultural Policy reforms starting from 1992. 
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4.3 1992 MacSharry reform 
From price support to individual payments, two important elements paved the way for the 
1992 MacSharry reform. First of all the above described international pressure being led 
by the United States and the argument that the EU created trade distortions and unfair 
advantages to their agricultural industry. Second that the CAP over time had become too 
expensive to the EU because of the price guaranty. The price guaranty or support involved 
keeping food prices higher than the market price to give farmers a higher and more stable 
income. There are two elements in this price guaranty, which led to an overproduction in 
agricultural produce, and serious budgetary problems for the European community. First of 
all because it created too high a level of production, in regards to demand so that the 
Union would have to buy the surplus, and because of the money having to be paid to the 
farmer for production. 
      The 92 reform revolved around the decoupling between policy making/subsidies and 
production. Production would no longer be a factor in the amount of money the individual 
farmer would receive. Prices would also be lowered on important agricultural commodities 
such as grain in order to decrease the production, which overreached demand an increase 
competitiveness on the markets. In order to maintain the feasibility of being a farmer in 
Europe individual payments replaced the price support system. Different criteria, namely 
the size of the farm, would decide the amount of money subsidized to the farmer. 
Furthermore, to avoid the previous decade of overproduction a compulsory set-aside 
policy was introduced. It only applied to farmers growing crops and meant that they would 
have a characteristic of their land, which were not allowed to be used. (Cini and Peres 
2013 p.318) Since farmers were no longer being paid for, the quantity of what they 
produced and instead for what they were actually able to sell, overproduction seized. 
Therefore, the European Union would no longer have to buy the surplus the market did not 
have any demand for, and the policy became much cheaper to operate. Another positive 
element was the better opportunity for developing countries to sell agricultural wares in the 
European markets. Removing the “unfair” advantage the pre 92 system of “protectionism” 
had given European farmers on the international agricultural markets. 
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4.4 The CAP from 92 
The MacSharry reform was the point of departure for the Common Agricultural Policy we 
know today. It marked the way for much deeper reform processes. The first post-
MacSharry reform was agreed in March 1999 and was implemented in the Commissions 
2000 agenda. In the larger context, it was a part of the Eastern enlargement at the time. 
A profound contribution to the structure of the CAP was made. Whereas since 92 the 
policy has mainly revolved around these individual payments to the farmers, now a second 
“pillar” would be added. A pillar concerning rural development for European farming. This 
new fund would be financed by the European Agricultural fund for rural development 
(EAFRD) through a measure called modulation, transferring funds from the “first pillar”, 
with the purpose of promoting sustainable rural development, by developing an agriculture, 
which is balanced from the regional and environmental point of view. 
         An important characteristic of this second pillar is that it is co-financed by the 
member state, thereby creating incentive to provide good supervision and control by local 
authorities. 
The overall development in the contributions to the CAP since 1992 arguably has been the 
decrease in prices of several major agricultural products. 
Furthermore, another dimension to the policy have increasingly been attempted 
implemented. This being the socio-economic dimension being formulated through this 
second pillar to promote sustainable farming and preserving the rural way of life. As 
mentioned the 2000 agenda made its first breakthrough in this direction, however at the 
time the second pillar were still marginal from a budgetary point of view. 
Nevertheless, the coming years would show a budgetary transfer from pillar 1 to 2 namely 
in 2003 and 2008, as well as a regulatory framework (2005) which would compose of three 
different themes: Improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry sector, 
improving the environment and the countryside and improving the quality of life in rural 
areas and encouraging diversification in the rural economy. (Cini,Peres 2013 p.319) 
          In larger terms, the reforms from 1992 have focused mainly on budgetary, 
economic, and trade distortive effects of Common Agricultural Policy instruments, guiding 
the path of reform. Although in later years, especially from 2005 we have seen other 
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important issues emerging and finding its way into the negotiations. Issues concerning 
rural development and environmental protection in particular. 
4.5 Introduction to Lobbying in the EU 
The objective of this chapter is to define organic farming possibilities to get influence in the 
CAP and EU. A large part will be defining how Lobbyism and interest representation work 
within EU. The mechanics of EU lobbyism is unique and complex. Therefore, we will map 
out the institutions and actors involved with the CAP. We will analyze and explain the 
actors and institutions roles for or against making organic farming matter within the 
bureaucracy of EU. 
        The institutions of the European Union work together with interest groups and 
organizations in many ways. It is not only a good way including the public in between 
elections, it is expected that interest groups listen to the public and mediate public 
concerns to the politicians (Cini, 2013. p. 183). 
Since EU is a large complex and dynamic system of institutions, there are many ways 
interest organizations can seek their influence. Depending on the issue and the type of 
representation group, who and where to consult is different from group to group. An 
organization as the Association of the German Chemical Industry Association that 
represents more than 1650 chemical companies would go to national government 
representation (Cini, 2013. p. 189). This makes sense in the way that the nationality is 
what the company and the EU actors have In common.  NGOs have a different approach 
since they are often multinational, Trans-European and even on a global scale. Since the 
interest of the various NGOs and CSOs are very different, it can be hard to mobilize at EU 
level. Business interest groups representation is much higher in the EU lobby program 
than the non-business interest groups are (Economic aspect of the interest groups). Some 
interest groups, such as Greenpeace, do not accept public funding (Cini, 2013. p. 192). 
This is a way to show they cannot be persuaded to leave a course or go against a 
European initiative.  In the beginning, the interest groups of EU mostly consisted of 
economic groups (CIni, 2013. p. 185). Much have happened to EU as an organization and 
governing unit. This have resulted in many different new interest representation groups, 
some have conflicting interest and therefore created a counter measurement. Other forms 
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interest groups are not made for self-materialistic gains. NGOs such as environmental 
protection groups, WWF and Greenpeace, grew into EU interest representation in together 
with public environmental awareness in the 70’s and 80’s (Cini, 2013. p. 185). 
        To exercise influence in the policy making process it is the only way to gain access to 
a EU institution, it is up to the specific interest group the make a cost benefit analysis to 
where to put the interest group effort (Bouwen 2001, p. 2). Very few interest groups have 
the abilities to influence at many levels. To combat mistrust of the public, and remove fear 
of corruption. Commissioner Siim Kallas initiated register for interest groups called, the 
European Transparency Initiation (Greenwood, 2011). Together with the registration of the 
interest group, they had to accept a code of conduct for interest representatives (European 
commission, 2008). 
The program Transparency Initiation was activated in 2008 and was a voluntary register 
for all interest groups seeking influence in EU policy-making (Cini, 2013 p. 188) 
The register was deemed a success, especially considering the registers predecessor, 
Consultation the European Commission and Civil Society, started as a mere telephone 
directory with fewer guidelines for the interest groups (Greenwood, 2011). 
4.6 The two pillars of the CAP 
In the following section, we will make it clear to the reader what the two pillars of the CAP 
contain today. 
The CAP is a redistributive policy. Meaning the money the member states pays for it, they 
get back in some form. Fundamentally, the Common Agricultural Policy consists of two 
pillars. The first and largest pillar have for a period of time after 1992 worked as the direct 
payment to the individual farmer. Simply a check the farmer earns because he/she owns 
land. The size of the subsidy would correspond to the amount of land owned. In newer 
times, especially after the 2003 mid-term review reform and the 2008 ‘health check’, this 
changed however. Regional calculations instead of individual would evaluate the average 
payment and distribute it to farmer through the Single Farm Payment (SFP). This was 
done in order to redress imbalances between big and small farmers. Thereby making it 
more feasible being a small farmer - promoting life in rural areas. However, due to 
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pressure from large-scale cereal growers and landowners this is not the case in France 
and the UK. (Cini and Perez 2013 p.316) 
       In general, the first pillar of the CAP is market regulation. In order to keep prices on 
various agricultural products down the European Union pays the farmer an additional 
“salary” to ensure the feasibility of his/her occupation while at the same time satisfying the 
European consumer. In regards to export the European Union, have responsibilities 
towards the farmer as well. If the price on the market the farmer wishes to sell in, is below 
the guaranteed price set by the EU they have to pay the difference. Known as the export 
refunds. These refunds have come under heavy critique from the international community 
as being of market enshrining nature. In the earlier discussed “GATT round - 1986” these 
refunds where one of the main attacking arguments against the CAP. To this day, they still 
exist. However, marginal in the budget. Much less, refunds are being payed, and there is 
growing political support for its abolition. 
The following quote is from the preamble of the 2013 CAP reform 
 “Refunds on exports to third countries, based on the difference between prices within the 
Union and on the world market, and falling within the limits set by the commitments made 
within the WTO, should be retained as a measure which may cover certain products to 
which this Regulation applies when conditions of the internal market fall under the scope of 
those described for exceptional measures. Subsidised exports should be subject to limits 
in terms of value and quantity, and, without prejudice to the application of exceptional 
measures, the refund available should be zero”. (http://capreform.eu) 
Despite the export refund, receding it still exists as an aid to the farmers. Additionally 
custom duties (tariffs on agricultural imports) is a “protectionist” instrument in pillar one, 
which again serves to protect the European farmer. (Cini and Peres 2013 p.316) 
4.6.1 Second pillar of the CAP 
As described earlier in our project, the second pillar of the CAP concerns rural 
development policy. The structure of this policy consists mainly of three axis. 
·         Axis 1 have the objective of improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and 
forestry sector. Its main instruments can be described as being modernization of 
agricultural holdings; adding value to agricultural and forestry products and 
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infrastructure. Its budget share between 2007-13 have been 35% 
(http://reformthecap.eu). 
·         Axis 2 have the objective of improving the environment and the countryside. The 
instruments used are agri-environmental payments to farmers in areas with 
“handicap”. Its budget share between 2007-13 have been 44% 
(http://reformthecap.eu). 
·         Axis 3 have the objective improving the life in rural areas and encouraging 
diversification in the rural economy. Its main instruments are village renewal and 
developments: Basic service for the economy and rural population; business 
creation and development. Its budget share between 2007-13 have been 19% 
(http://reformthecap.eu). 
Each member state have to co-finance these programs with somewhere between 10-50% 
of the allocated budget in order to micromanage the initiatives. Around 20% of the CAP 
budget is allocated to the second pillar. 
In a general sense, the second pillar can be viewed as a more direct way of developing the 
European agricultural sector especially in regards to the environment. However, pillar 1 
have “greening” elements as well. From 2015, the “green direct payment” have been a part 
of the CAP. 70% of the national direct payment envelope in pillar 1 goes to the farmer; the 
remaining 30% are awarded to the farmers who respect 3 obligatory agricultural practices. 
Namely maintenance of permanent grassland, ecological focus areas, and crop 
diversification (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/policy-perspectives) 
Therefore, both pillars aim a certain direction whereas the second pillar works as a specific 
area target. That being rural development. 
4.7 Path dependency 
Path dependency is an idea that tries to explain how the set of decisions one faces for any 
given circumstance is limited by the decisions one has made in the past. This holds true 
even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant and more efficient decisions 
are available due to the previous commitment made. Path dependency occurs because it 
is often easier or more cost effective to simply continue along an already set path than to 
create an entirely new one (Kay 2003). 
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A system is path dependent if it chooses to move in one direction at first and further 
down the road chooses to stick to the same direction. This could also be understood by 
acknowledging that there are self-reinforcing mechanisms or positive feedbacks (Kay 
2003). The project has chosen to use Douglass North interpretation of path dependency, 
to explain the constraints a system face on a future set of choices. “At every step along the 
way there are choices – political and economic – that provide … real alternatives. Path 
dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision-making 
trough time. It is not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future.” 
(North, 1990). 
The question of the methodological status of the concept path dependency has 
been raised among scholars. This is because path dependency is not a framework, theory 
or model, because it does not provide a general list that can be used to organize 
diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry. Furthermore, it does not present hypotheses about 
specific links between variables or parameters of those links. Path dependence is instead 
a concept that can be used to label a certain type of temporal process (Kay 2003). In other 
words, the project does not use the concept of path dependency to explain why systems 
sometimes develop in this way. It is rather employed in a broad institutionalist framework 
in order to explain the micro foundations of path dependent processes. It is the institutions 
that are path dependent and the challenge of the project will be to discover the relevant 
explanations in the operation of systems in the institutions and their interaction with the 
wider socio-economic and political environment. By defining a EU policy like the CAP as 
an institution and by applying the concept this project attempts to present a better 
understanding of the decision-making regarding the CAP. 
4.7.1 The CAP as an institution 
Scholars who have used path dependency have almost exclusively done that within a 
broad institutionalist framework. Furthermore, the concept has particularly been used in a 
historical institutionalism association. Within this frame, three levels of institutions are 
usually divided into the macro or constitutional level; the collective choice or policy 
decision level; and the operational level of individual decisions (Kay 2005). This project will 
be focusing on path dependency on the policy level in order to apply it to the development 
of the CAP. Adrian Kay (2005) mentions that there are some justified hesitations to the 
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claim of policies being path dependent, because of the fact that policy and institutions are 
different. Policy is the choice of reason for action or inaction, the choice of policy 
instruments, the choice of how to act to the consequences of policy outputs. The 
characteristics of institutions are their collective acceptance of rules and constraints to 
govern behavior; no matter how big they are or what the intentional goal is or what function 
they have (Kay 2005). The conceptual contrast between a policy and an institution are 
important when it comes to the use of path dependency in policy studies. There are two 
ways one can apply this concept when studying policy. One is to move forward by 
comparing institutions to policy as the subject of path dependency and thereby allow one 
to work in the existing body of historical institutionalism so it can be used to support 
theory-building and empirical testing in clearly defined policy. The other is to apply and 
theorize the concept in policy development (Kay, 2005). This project will proceed by 
choosing the first option. 
4.7.2 The development of the CAP 
As known, the CAP is a long-standing policy and has undergone several challenges but 
kept on going without big changes up until 1992 when the MacSharry reforms occurred. 
Even after these reforms, the CAP has been able to contain its basic objectives and 
remain stable (Kay 2003). This could be argued to be a proof of the inefficiency of the 
CAP. Furthermore, the lack of a functionalist explanation for its development appears to be 
the difficult puzzle to solve. In order to apply the concept of path dependency, the analysis 
has to look back at the history of the CAP. This is because in a path dependent system, 
sequencing matters because it is events in the beginning that moved policies in one 
direction that encourage developments in the future to take the same path (Kay 2003). 
        The history of the CAP is an example of early developments becoming embedded in 
particular political environment, which has modified the incentive structure and therefore 
affected political and economic decisions. Commitments and objectives for the support of 
agriculture is part of the article 39 of the Treaty of Rome, which helped set the agenda for 
the Stresa conference of 1958 and started negotiations about the making of the CAP 
(Tracy 1989). This was all in the interest of raising the productivity within agriculture as 
well as help along the technological progress, which made the choice of high prices the 
solution of support. The basic policy structure of the CAP was set after the Stresa 
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conference were three pillars emerged (Tracy 1989). It contained a single agricultural 
market, community preference and financial cohesion through common financing of the 
CAP through the EU budget. This came with a consequence that was not intended, and 
that was the coherent pressure it had on the EU budget. Around 1969 prices were well 
above the world levels and the CAP was fully implemented. Furthermore, several 
commodity regimes were already in surplus (Kay 2003). By the 1980’s further 
consequences of the CAP appeared in the form of international trade negotiations being 
adversely affected. Why this initial policy structure has remained in place is as mentioned 
the question and the puzzle. 
         The scholar Adrian Kay (2003) argues that in order for one to make path 
dependency claims on the CAP one have to produce arguments about more specific 
micro-level mechanisms of the CAP. This leads the research to the presentation of three 
feedback mechanisms in order to provide these arguments. The Committee of 
Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA), it provides the argument of the first 
feedback mechanism. This is the effect of the CAP on interest groups. Adrian Kay (2003) 
argues that COPA has had a role in the bureaucratic functioning of the CAP system. This 
is concluded by the fact that COPA has 50 percent of the membership of the commission’s 
advisory, management and regulatory committees that exist for each of the CAP product 
regimes. However multiple researches made on the reforms of the CAP through the 
1980’s and 1990’s states that COPA has not had any significant role and very little 
influence when making these reforms (Kay 2003). Still policies can affect group’s attempts 
to provide decision-makers with intended resources e.g. through easier access to the 
decision-makers and this may restrict the possibility of self-government. To what extend 
does the implementation of CAP reform need assistance from COPA and national farm 
groups in order to reach a successful outcome? That is the question from the 
commission’s point of view (Kay, 2003). It is well known that COPA has the advantage of 
technical knowledge end the organizational structure that acts as a resource when the 
agenda is to implement the CAP regime. Furthermore, this COPA power can be the 
reason for an increase in the cost when implementing new policies and this may prevent 
the CAP from taking a new path (Kay, 2003). One could argue that COPA have the power 
of limiting reform options that are considered by decision-makers. 
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Another policy feedback mechanism the project will look at, is that policy transform the 
future possibilities for policies by shifting overall state capacity. The scholar Theda Skocpol 
describes it very well: “Policies transform or expand the capacities of the state. They 
therefore change the administrative possibilities for official initiatives in the future, and 
affect later prospects for policy implementation.” (Skocpol 1992: 52). When implementing a 
policy the administrative resources affect its viability. Furthermore when handling a policy 
as complex as the CAP a development of systems with administrative skills, technical 
knowledge and management specific to policies will appear. The cost of specializing these 
systems may be sunk cost, due to the fact that the systems cannot be used in regards to 
other policies and thereby making it costly if a desire to switch policies rise. As Adrian Kay 
(2003) argues: “The administrative legacy of the CAP as a price support system may have 
proscribed certain options for reform of the CAP in the budget crises of 1984 and 1988.” 
The reason for the thinking of status quo by the commission and member states may be 
the consequence of high costs to switch administrative resources. 
        Policies can have big consequences at an individual level and it is here we find the 
third feedback mechanism. The individuals affected by policies make commitments and 
investments because of the policies made and are therefore vulnerable to increased cost if 
new policies are made in the future. This is of course because of the change in 
commitments and new investments these individuals would have to make. Pierson (1993: 
609) describes this: “Policies may encourage individuals to develop particular skills, make 
certain kinds of investments, purchase certain kinds of goods, or devote time and money 
to certain kinds of organizations.” The argument is that the farmers can influence the CAP 
decision-makers because of the farmer’s expectations. The decisions made within the 
CAP force, to some extent, farmers to act and make decisions that will involve costs and 
commitments that will be hard to reverse and thereby become a problem for the farmer’s if 
new directions are made to the CAP. An example could be the move from normal 
production to organic production. 
        The difficulties for policy-makers to revers or change direction, exists because of 
farmers sunk costs and the commitments they have through the CAP support. This 
difficulty is separate from other difficulties mentioned like the pressure from farm interest 
groups, and represents the possibility of political backlash as farmers may undermine 
established relationship (Kay, 2005). 
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4.7.3 CAP reforms 
Even though the projects previous section argues that there have been changes to the 
CAP through time, it does not disapprove the hypothesis of the CAP being path 
dependent. The concept of path dependency is not saying that a policy is unable to 
change over time. However, there is a point where changes in policy can be judged as a 
change in direction or shift in the developmental path (Kay, 2003). These changes are 
usually called branching points or critical junctures. In order to use the concept of path 
dependency fully in understanding the CAP, this project will have to go along with the 
claim of Adrian Kay (2003) that the MacSharry reforms of 1992 were a critical juncture in 
the CAP. The MacSharry reforms changed the key arable crops prices to a third of its 
price. Direct import payments were then to be made to the farmer as a compensation for 
the cuts. Furthermore, farmers were given the possibility of being compensated for taking 
15 percent of their land out of production. Until then these cuts were the most substantial 
cuts in the history of the CAP, and it meant that scholars began to define these reforms as 
radical (Kay, 2003).  
        However, other works have concluded that the reforms were somewhat moderate 
(Kay, 1998), because of the fact that some of the farmer’s income still was paired with the 
production of the farmer, and therefore the motivation of overproduction still existed. As 
mentioned earlier it is difficult to restrict “policy” into a single variable, because of the fact 
that the observer’s judgment of policy change remains central. The project assumes that 
the MacSharry reforms of 1992 were a critical juncture, in order to investigate the 
relationship between policy change and path dependency further. The argument behind it 
being that the critical juncture was a break in the path of the CAP and that the policy 
direction shifted significantly. When significant external shocks interfere with the usual 
mechanisms of reproduction, it causes critical junctures (Hacker, 1998: 78). When it 
comes to the observation of path dependency in the CAP, critical juncture creates a threat 
to the hypotheses that the CAP is path dependent.  This project wants to present the 
limitation to the concept of path dependency and seeks to do so by elaborating the 
weaknesses in accommodating externally induced radical policy change. Hacker (1998) 
argued that: “the idea of path dependencies perhaps best suited to explaining the 
reproduction of a critical juncture legacy rather than the production of the critical juncture 
itself.” Several external shocks to the CAP have been identified (Kay, 2003) one could 
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mention the budget crisis in 1983 and 1988. This forced the CAP reforms on to the 
European Council agenda, but has not been judged as critical juncture but rather as 
moderate (Daugbjerg, 1999). So why was the external shock different in 1992, than before 
and what was it that made the CAP react to the external shock in 1992? Path dependency 
helps to present the process of the dynamic and iterative feedback loops that connects 
past policy decisions, the CAP decision-making system and current policy decisions. 
However, the CAP also produces consequences on the EU budget, international trade 
negotiations, and the environment, but does so unintentionally (Kay, 2003). This can 
become politically mobilized to a degree which can affect the usual mechanisms that 
reproduce policy in a path dependent way. In other words the reinforcement mechanisms 
of the CAP can have unintended, external effects which produce pressure for change and 
shocks to the existing policy path. In the case of critical juncture, the policy legacy of the 
CAP acts to reinforce policy adaption in a certain actual direction, thus there is a break in a 
critical juncture (Kay, 2003). Therefore, this presents us with the limit to the use of the 
concept of path dependency, when using it to describe the development of the CAP over 
time. Thus the puzzle becomes to investigate how; the policy legacy of the CAP as an 
institution become reduced in force, the feedback mechanism disturbed, and a new path 
gets created? It has been discussed that such a reason could be seen as a “big bang” 
view of major policy change. In other words, one external shock produces one qualified 
change in policy (Kay, 2003). However, it can also be argued that policy may also change 
significantly over time without a “big bang” event like the mentioned budget crisis. When a 
new policy instrument is introduced to the CAP even though they may seem moderate, 
may have increasing consequences for the development of the CAP through the operation 
of positive feedback loops (Kay, 2003). This significant increasing effect can be 
understood with the concept of path dependency. The stabilizer system introduced in 1988 
with the combination of the existing motivation in the CAP for farmers to produce more, the 
automatic penalty mechanisms for overproduction led to a series of price cuts and a threat 
for future price cuts (Kay 2003). This could be argued to be the first branch points in the 
development of the CAP rather than the MacSharry reform, because this were the first 
time the policy legacy of the CAP started to include price cuts. Furthermore, the reforms of 
1999 followed the reforms of 1992 and did so by substituting high prices with direct 
payments (Kay, 2003: Ackrill, 2000). The possibility of direct income payments, which 
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were introduced in 1992, have given future policy-makers the possibility of reducing the 
direct income payment over time, and to target their support to smaller farmers. Thereby 
the MacSharry reforms have changed the composition of available policy instruments. The 
concept of path dependency presents the argument of CAP reforms being linked through 
time. CAP reforms changes the institution of the policy legacy of the CAP and therefore 
also the instruments available to future CAP policy-makers. 
       
4.8 Policy network 
A policy network is an organized arrangement created to aid the intermediation between 
state actors and organized interests groups. The policy network concept is a meso-level 
concept. Meso-level analysis focuses on the relationship between government (or EU 
directorate-generals) and interest groups (Daugbjerg, 1999) and analyses relationships 
which are structural rather than personal. Political actors creates a policy network when 
they exchange resources often. Furthermore, any organization that wishes to enter the 
policy process is dependent on other organizations and their resources (Daugbjerg, 1999). 
Therefore, organizations have to exchange resources if they want to realise their goals or 
objectives. Policy networks may become disassociated from the strategic choices. In such 
situations, the structure of the network becomes an important determinant of policy 
choices and outcomes. This is particularly emphasized in the structural policy network 
approach (the Marsh and Rhodes model) which explicitly states that ‘the structure of 
networks affects outcomes’ (Daugbjerg, 1999). However, the mechanism, which links 
networks with policy choices and outcomes should be, more clearly stated (Daugbjerg, 
1999). 
       Originally, the policy network approach was developed to analyze national policy-
making. Whether or not it can be used at EU level to analyze policy-making in various 
issue areas has been debated by different scholars one of them, Peterson (1995) strongly 
defends policy networks utility at EU level (Daugbjerg, 1999). Policy network analysis is 
particularly suited to studies of EU policy processes for at least three reasons (Daugbjerg, 
1999). Firstly, the EU, as a relatively young political system, generally lacks formal and 
well-established institutions, although in some policy fields the EU has established well-
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developed institution such as its agricultural policy. This leads to uncertainty, and to cope 
with this, EU policy-makers tend to set up policy networks (which is one type of institution) 
to achieve predictability and stability in the policy process (Daugbjerg, 1999). For instance, 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the EU Commission actively supported the formation of 
agricultural interest associations at the EU level and established an institutionalized 
relationship with these (Daugbjerg, 1999). Furthermore, within the field of transnational 
local authority networking, Benington and Harvey (1998) argue that the Commission 
actively takes part in network formation. Thus, since the policy network approach is 
developed to analyze policy-making taking place within informal organizational 
arrangements, it is also a relevant research tool at the EU level (Daugbjerg, 1999). 
Furthermore, Peterson argues that many important decisions in the EU are made in the 
early stages of the policy process. The network approach is particularly suited to analyzing 
such situations irrespective of whether they occur at the national or at the EU level. 
Thirdly, at the EU level, political actors are as dependent on each other’s resources as 
they are at the national level and since resource interdependency is at the center of policy 
network analysis it can be applied at both levels (Daugbjerg, 1999). The existence of a 
policy network within a policy field can usually help to explain why groups who benefit from 
a policy succeed in resisting pressure for radical reform, and thus network analysis is a 
useful approach to analyzing the absence of fundamental reforms of the CAP. The key to 
revealing the different opportunities for reform embodied in a network is to analyze its 
degree of cohesion (Daugbjerg, 1999). 
         Among the members of cohesive policy networks, there is a consensus on principles 
and thus on the policy paradigm. There may, however, be varying views on the details of 
policy and sometimes even on the specific instruments to apply. When pressure for reform 
arises, the network members are likely to defend the existing policy paradigm because 
doing so comes naturally to them and because radical reforms bring about uncertainty, 
which they want to avoid (Daugbjerg, 1999). Firstly, this uncertainty arises because it is 
difficult to know in advance which consequences a radically reformed policy may have. In 
other words, there is a risk of bringing about unintended consequences. For instance, the 
deregulation of agricultural policy may lead to a higher number of bankruptcies than 
foreseen. Secondly, it is unlikely that the network formed around an existing policy 
survives fundamental reforms. Consequently, members holding central and powerful 
Side 36 af 58 
 
positions within the network may lose power when it is redesigned. For these reasons, 
members of cohesive networks are likely to defend the existing policy. 
Members of cohesive networks are powerful because they control the expertise within their 
policy field and when outsiders threaten their control over that field, the consensus on 
policy principles enables them to meet reformers with forceful counter arguments. These 
are often of a highly technical nature. Usually, the purpose of such arguments is to 
convince other actors ‘that “outsiders” are not qualified to make decisions in a given area 
(Daugbjerg, 1999). Thus, members of cohesive policy networks are able to form strong 
coalitions defending the status quo. However, in order to have reform demands removed 
from the agenda, policy network members may agree to give concessions to reformers. 
These concessions may be moderate changes (Daugbjerg, 1999). 
        The concept of policy network will thereby be one of the concepts, which this project 
is to use when analysing CAP and the historical context of CAP. The project will therefore 
examine the 1992 reform in regards to CAP and examine if the reform was a critical 
juncture and a fundamental change within the policy of CAP. 
4.8.1 Policy Network analysis of the 1992 reform 
In this chapter we will be analysing the the MacSharry reform from 1992 and how the EU 
agricultural policy network influenced the Commission’s formation of policy preferences. 
Furthermore, we will define whether or not the reform was a radical reform as it has been 
defined by the EU. 
        Daugbjerg (1999) defines that there are three different types of policy reforms. The 
first order includes changes in instrument settings, or levels, are changed, objectives, 
instruments and policy paradigms remain the same. The second order includes changes in 
objectives, instruments and their settings are altered, policy paradigms remain the same. 
The third order includes in changes objectives, instrument settings, instruments and policy 
paradigms are changed. 
The first and second orders are moderate reforms whereas third order changes are 
fundamental or radical changes (Daugbjerg, 1999). In agricultural policy a first order 
change could alter prices, a second order change could alter the policy instruments and a 
third order change could be when the EU stops safeguarding farmers against  the market 
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in the setting of commodity prices and relies on market forces to set prices (Daugbjerg, 
1999). 
      Above, it has been argued that the existence of a cohesive policy network in the sector 
in which reformers attempt to bring about change is a major factor preventing fundamental 
policy reforms. Therefore, the network model suggests that one important reason why the 
reform in 1992 was relatively moderate was due to the existence of a cohesive agricultural 
policy network in the EU. 
To test this proposition, We will firstly examine whether the EU agricultural policy network 
is cohesive and, secondly, undertake an analysis to reveal whether the network actually 
influenced the Commission’s and the farmers’ formation of policy preferences. The degree 
of cohesion in a policy network can be established by analyzing the extent to which, over 
time, there has been stability on policy objectives (Daugbjerg, 1999). If these have not 
changed and have not been challenged by core members of the network, there is good 
reason to believe that a consensus on a policy paradigm exists within the network, which 
therefore has a high degree of cohesion. 
       A major objective of the Common Agricultural Policy is the commitment of the 
community to maintain the family farm as the foundation of the European agriculture; this 
has been a more or less official opinion (Daugbjerg, 1999). 
This goal was written into the Stresa declaration from 1958, which set up the main 
principles of the CAP. It was stated that: ‘given the importance of the family farm structure 
of European agriculture and the unanimous wish to safeguard this character, every effort 
should be made to raise the economic and competitive capacity of such enterprises’ 
(Daugbjerg, 1999). In the Green Paper, which is a paper released by the European 
Commission is a discussion document intended to stimulate debate and launch a process 
of consultation, at European level, on a particular topic. A green paper usually presents a 
range of ideas and is meant to invite interested individuals or organizations to contribute 
views and information. The Commission confirmed that ‘the family farm is still regarded as 
fundamental’ and that ‘every effort should be applied to increase the economic capacity 
and competitiveness of the family farms’ (Commission, 1985, Daugbjerg’s translation, 
1999). Therefore, the analysis of policy objectives shows clearly that there is a high degree 
of stability in the CAP’s objectives. The consensus on policy objectives is closely related 
with the absence of a strong interest counterbalancing farmers within the network 
Side 38 af 58 
 
(Daugbjerg, 1999). Farm interests dominate the network. Up until the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the European association of national farmers’ unions (COPA), the Agriculture 
Commissioner, the Commission’s Agricultural Directorate (DGVI), national farm ministers 
and national ministries of agriculture were the core members of the EU agricultural 
network. The budgetary pressures, which arose in the late 1970s and early 1980s, put 
COPA in a difficult position (Daugbjerg, 1999). 
Its ability to present realistic policy proposals declined and this resulted in a change in the 
Commission’s strategy. The Commission turned to the Special Committee of Agriculture 
for support for its proposals and this meant that it indirectly strengthened the position of 
the national farm associations and the national ministries of agriculture (Daugbjerg, 1999). 
It is important to point out that the decline of COPA’s influence did not pave the way for the 
influence of non-agricultural interests. BEUC, the EU consumer union, is a member of the 
policy network, but does not belong to its core (Daugbjerg, 1999) and therefore it has 
never been in a position to challenge the objectives of the CAP. However, since this 
reform the BEUC has gained more influence due to reforms after 1992 and the treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009. 
        The stability in policy objectives indicates that there is an agreement on policy 
principles within the agricultural policy network. This, in turn, indicates that the network has 
a relatively high degree of cohesion, this means that the core members of the network 
share the view that the Community should intervene in agriculture to protect farmers from 
the impacts of free market forces in commodity price setting (Daugbjerg, 1999). 
Safeguarding farmers’ incomes and increasing the economic and competitive capacity of 
the European family farms demand that the EU plays a significant role in the agricultural 
sector. The core members of the agricultural policy network have not questioned this 
interventionist policy paradigm; rather they have defended it (Daugbjerg, 1999). In order to 
establish that the network had an influence on the 1992 reform outcome, it is necessary to 
go beyond correlation and show that the network members’ policy positions were based on 
the network’s interventionist policy paradigm, which stated that market forces should set 
commodity prices only to a limited extent. Agriculture Commissioner Ray MacSharry made 
this clear in July 1990 when he said that ‘[w]e are fully engaged in the Uruguay Round 
process. But let me make it clear, we are doing so on the basis of our commitment to the 
CAP’ (Daugbjerg, 1999). Furthermore, MacSharry was against liberalizing world 
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agricultural trade, stating that the whole idea of agricultural trade liberalization was based 
on unreliable academic arguments (Daugbjerg, 1999). EU Commission President at the 
time, Delors, supported him by claiming that the abolishment of EU export subsidies would 
‘destroy the EU agriculture industry’. (Daugbjerg, 1999) This shows that the Commission 
and in particular the Agriculture Commissioner and the Directorate for Agriculture (DG VI) 
would not accept that a future CAP would be based on the principles of the market place. 
Instead, there was strong support for the idea that the EU should continue to take 
responsibility for farmers’ standard of living (Daugbjerg, 1999). 
       The Directorate for Agriculture realized in late 1990 that the GATT rounds in Uruguay 
could not be completed until the CAP had undergone reforms, and therefore began to 
prepare a reform proposal (Daugbjerg, 1999).  The Directorate presented three reform 
papers outlining a reformed CAP from December 1990 to July 1991. All three of these 
papers was a second order change and would change the arable market regimes and a 
first order change in the animal sector (Daugbjerg, 1999). Furthermore, the Commission 
suggested a direct compensation scheme combined with set-aside requirements to 
compensate farmers for income losses and to cut down production (Daugbjerg, 1999). 
Therefore, it can be argued that the reform from 1992 was not that radical of a reform, as it 
had been claimed to be. The reason why the MacSharry reform is not radical or 
fundamental is because the Community should still protect farmers from market forces. 
Increasing income certainty and stability even strengthened that principle. Farmers would 
still receive large subsidies but in a different way. There was no serious attempt to leave 
the farmer to the mercy of the market (Daugbjerg, 1999). 
        It can therefore be concluded that the 1992 agricultural policy reform in the EU was a 
moderate one because there was a consensus within the agricultural policy network, that 
EU agricultural policy should be highly interventionist in the setting of commodity prices in 
order to ensure farmers’ incomes. Furthermore, the existence of a cohesive policy network 
in the sector, in which reform is put onto the agenda, limits the opportunities for 
fundamental reform. Members of such a network can form a strong coalition resisting 
change. In addition, it can also be concluded using path dependence that the 1992 reform 
was not as radical or fundamental as many claim it to be. It can still be argued that the 
1992 reform was an important critical juncture and help shape future CAP reforms, but still 
following in the path of previous decisions made. 
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In the following chapter, we will be conducting a comparative case study concerning 
organic farming in the EU and the wind turbine industry. The case will look at how each of 
these industries have achieved  at influencing policy decision making in the EU and look at 
the power balance between the interest groups from the each industry. 
 
Chapter 5 
Comparative case study 
 Case study on the wind turbine interest organization and organic farmers interest 
organization 
 
The following section will scrutinize what characterizes lobbying in the European Union, 
and attempt to estimate its impact in the political arena. Following we will employ the 
institutionalist approach of rational choice theory in our analysis of a case study 
concerning the interest groups of respectively ecological farmers and the wind turbine 
industry. 
       In the European Union, there still exists a certain amount of unregulated lobbying. 
Also called hidden lobbying. Since it is not obligatory for lobbyists to be registered as, they 
are for example in the United States it is very difficult to estimate just how much lobbying is 
going on in the European Union. (Svendsen 2011 p.133) 
The EU political system can be defined as pluralistic with all lobby groups being in free 
competition. Much preferable for smaller producer groups instead of corporatism, which 
will automatically include larger producer groups and more weakly organized producer 
groups (p.133) Therefore the Commission using its role as initiator of legislation can 
choose which producer groups it want to incorporate in the legislative preparation 
processes. This I in big contrast to for example the Scandinavian model which uses the 
corporate model. With formal rules including every affected party in the process. Producer 
and consumer. Although lobbying in the EU is not entirely without rules. SEAP (Society of 
European Affairs Professionals) have established a code of conduct. Which evaluates 
acceptable behavior for a long list of lobbying groups in Bruxelles with access to the 
European Parliament. If this code of conduct were to be broken, they could lose their 
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admission right to meetings. However, this all seems rather vague, and with no official 
records of who is actually lobbying for who it is difficult to have transparency on where the 
pressure for legislation is coming from. 
The Commission brought a lobby register into effect in June 2011. (.euractiv.com) The 
register sought to make lobby activities more transparent via the implementation of three 
regulations. First, information on the corporation between interest groups and lobbyists will 
be published on the internet, including information the general goals of the lobbyists and 
how they are funded. Second, a voluntary registration of interest groups in the EU 
database, there must be an incentive for registration, namely that consultation regarding 
EU initiatives is contingent upon registration. Third that interest groups must sign a 
declaration of good conduct which would mean different things, namely that they are 
honest to the Commission, not giving any misleading information and that they do not offer 
inducement in return for favorable regulation(Svendsen 2011 p.134). 
Following we will utilize a case study between the lobbying of organic farming and wind 
turbines in the European Union in our discussion of the impact they can have in policy 
making. 
5.1 Policy network comparison 
In order to measure the representative power of organic farming in the EU, we will in this 
chapter make a policy networks analysis of organic farming. It is our intention to link the 
concept of path dependence with the policy networks and lobbyism. Thereby showing a 
power imbalance within the creation of the CAP that through path dependency makes 
reform difficult in favor of organic farming in EU. 
        We will argue that the newer interest group register, the European Transparency 
Register (ETR), might help create a better network for organic farmers that they have not 
had before. If the ETR is going as planned organic farmer’s interest groups will get better 
possibilities to “create a culture of consultation” (Greenwood, 2011) 
Since the conventional farming have had their influence within EU policy since the first 
agricultural regulatory managements and committees we established in 1962 and 1968 
(Heard‐Lauréote, 2008) and (Moshitz and Stolze, 2007. P. 56). Since then the 
conventional farming society have had possibilities to enlarge and engage their policy 
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networks within the EU. Organic farming lobbyist have not been presented in EU lobby 
until 1970s and IFOAM EU Group was only instituted in 2000 (ibid.). 
IFOAM EU is the only interest organization who only works with organic farming lobbying 
in the Brussel offices. 
       When other interest groups within the EU, the biggest such as WWF, COPA and 
European community of consumer cooperative that is working with organic Agricultural 
policy have such a low priority with organic farming the reason to this is that they see 
organic farming as a just a part farming as a whole. No more than ten percent of the 
working staff is used working with organic lobbying (Moshitz and Stolze, 2007 p. 64). The 
low interest in organic farming as a concept outside of agriculture makes it difficult for a 
network to be standing on its own. It is a clear point to make when comparing organic 
network policy to conventional agriculture. Since it is not even seen by most groups as a 
network on its own, but as a part of the much larger agriculture network. Though it makes 
sense that the organic agricultural organizations in the EU is growing from larger 
organizations since “any organization entering the policy process is dependent on other 
organizations for resources” (Daugbjerg, 1999 p. 412). 
By comparing the expenses of both COPA-COGECA and IFOAM EU, we would be able to 
deduct an economical overview of their Organic engagement. 
COPA-COGECA budgetarily spend in 2014 together, by COPA (>= 1.750.000 Euros and < 
1.999.999 Euros) and COGECA (>= 1.000.000 Euros and < 1.249.999 Euros).  
This is approximately >= 2.999.999 Euros and < 3.249.998 Euros. If we take, ten percent 
of the money spend as suggested earlier by Moshitz and stolze, we get between 29.999 
and 32.500 Euros spend on organic lobbying by COPA-COGECA. All numbers are taken 
from the European Transparency Register (Ec.europa.eu). 
If we compare these figures with the money, spend by IFOAM EU on organic lobbying in 
2014, who spend all their time and effort on organic farming. 
IFOAM EU spend >= 1.250.000 Euros and < 1.499.999 Euros (Ec.europa.eu). IFOAM EU 
spend in 2014 four times as much money as COPA-COGECA on organic farming 
lobbyism. Therefore, IFOAM EU is economic wise much more representative than COPA-
COGECA. It could be argued that COPA-COGECA have a much larger and better network 
as an organization with the agricultural community in the EU institution. By comparing 
these figures, we would argue that the organic farmers is better represented by IFOAM 
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than COPA-COGECA, since organic farming and conventional farming might have 
contradiction agendas. 
       By having such a huge organization as COPA-COGECA to represent all farmers, it is 
possible to awake some problems. IFOAM EU mention that they have had difficulties 
approaching COPA-COGECA; this can suggest that there is a rivalry between who is the 
real representor of organic farmers in EU (Moshitz and Stolze, 2007 p. 52). COPA-
COGECA claim they represent all farmers in the EU, but by representing a large group of 
individuals, some groups within the cooperation might not be very well represented. What 
confirms this further is that reputational power for organic farming policy of selected actors 
show (Moshitz and stolze, 2007 p. 53). 
Like all policy networks within the EU, the organic policy networks of IFOAM EU and 
COPA-COGECA have the ability to outlive national government. Before the Lisbon treaty 
in 2009, interest groups focused their energy on national lobbyism (Peterson and 
Bomberg, 1999. P. 23). At the time the lobbyist had their best chance making an 
impression and drive through their agendas. This has changed now. Since the Lisbon 
treaty, the interest groups have multiplied the amount of people working as lobbyist in 
Brussel. This is because the policymaking has changed from a conciliation to a co-
decision legislative system. Before the Lisbon treaty the European commission and the 
European Council would together with the working group Special Committee of Agriculture 
(SCA), the Agricultural Council only had agree among themselves. The European 
Parliament very rarely had anything to do with setting the CAP (Peterson and Blomberg, 
1999. P.23). The decisions for the CAP were prepared by the SCA and passed by the 
Agricultural Council thereby giving the European Parliament very little jurisdiction on the 
agricultural area. The SCA did not need that much legitimacy to get keep a status quo on 
the CAP policies. This is absolutely within the EU farm lobbies interest to keep the CAP, 
as it is (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999. P. 139). Thereby withholding an artificial path 
dependency. 
        With the Lisbon treaty, being in action the European parliament suddenly had a say 
within the legislative proposals with the CAP. Thereby undermining the centralized power 
of the SCA. The SCA had to convince the European Parliament with the legitimacy of their 
proposals. Thereby making the networks of the EU agricultural sector very important. 
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With the Lisbon treaty and the Ordinary Legislative Procedure from 2009 in action, interest 
groups now have highly relevant target for lobbying (Cini, 2013 p. 186). We must assume 
that through interest groups with an already build policy network have better possibility for 
access. Already existing and large groups have better connection and resources to trade 
is thereby being in a better position to get influence. 
 
Firstly, the EU subsidies for organic farming fall under both pillar one, and two. Pillar one 
as the direct payment to the farmer (the same way the conventional farmer receives 
support), and through the second pillar where the organic farmer may receive support 
through the development of rural districts. 
In the second pillar of the CAP, environmental protection and sustainability are 
emphasized as important motivational factors for the development of organic farming and 
rural development. However, there are no binding rules or goals from the European Union 
as to how these sectors should be developed, how the money should be spent. This is 
largely up to the member state to decide. 
In regards to EU representation for the organic farmers, their largest interest group is the 
IFOAM EU Group. It consists independently under the umbrella organization International 
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements or just IFOAM. The IFOAM EU Group have 
approximately 300 members in the EU, which includes consumer groups, producer 
groups, organic organizations, research institutions, certification centres, consultant 
groups, distributors and development organizations. The organization opened an office in 
Bruxelles in 2003. (Svendsen 2011 p.135) Numbers from 2008 indicate that there are 
approximately 186.000 organic farmers in the EU, making it large but arguably dispersed 
interest wise. 
       In opposition to organic farming, there are clear targets for renewable energy. By 
2020, 20 percent of the member states electricity consumption must come from renewable 
sources (Svendsen 2011 p.135). The formulated policy puts heavy reliance on the wind 
turbine industry in particular. Uddyb 
“By 2020, wind energy is expected to have overtaken hydropower as the EU´s largest 
source of renewable electricity and the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) 
believes that renewable energies – with a significant contribution from the wind sector – 
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alongside energy efficiency constitute the only possible solution to the EU´s future energy 
challenges” (EWEA, 2010). 
We see a clear connection between the political goals for renewable energy and the 
expectation of the industry. This stands in contrast to the environmental target levels for 
organic farming and will thus not aid the future market share for organic farming in the 
same magnitude as for the wind turbine industry.(Svendsen 2011 p.136) 
What can explain these different political goals for the two industries? Consequently the 
different outcomes of lobbying by the two interest groups. 
In the following section, we will utilize our theoretical framework in discussion of the above-
described cases 
5.2 Rational Institutionalist Explanation 
Our theoretical approach revolves around institutionalism. An important part of this theory 
is rational choice. It operates mainly on the meso level and can be divided into three 
stages. The first stage sees politicians and decision-makers as economically rational, and 
in overall profit maximizing. The second stage of the theory argues that economically 
rational producer groups will seek rent/aid through government interventions in the market 
economy. Which at the cost of consumers and taxpayers could result in an economic net 
gain for the producer group. The main argument of the third stage is that group size affects 
the group's capability of organizing and initiating lobby activities. Smaller groups would 
have an advantage since it should be easier for them to solve collective action problems, 
and invest in lobbying up to the amount of rent/aid they could possibly gain. (Svendsen 
2011 p.136) 
       In regards to political aid, where the 2020 plan for renewable energy could be 
regarded as such in favor of the wind turbine industry. Rational choice can explain this by 
describing the political actors behind the 2020 target as simply being economical rational 
profit-maximizing actors. I.e. regarding the wind turbine industry as being a) a more 
profitable business and b) being more important in regards to the environment. 
Secondly, rational choice can be used to explain the relation between the amount of 
resources the interest group is willing to spend on achieving a certain political goal and 
their expectations of the outcome of this “investment”. 
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The theory tells us that the interest group is willing to spend resources on lobbying up to 
the amount of economic gain, which the political act would grant. (Svendsen 2011 p.136: 
Tollison 2000) The EWEA have spent a fair amount on lobbying in Bruxelles since its 
founding in 1982 (Svendsen 2011 p.140) which could be an indicator that they have had 
clear and very attainable goals with the politicians. To emphasize we have Compared 
IFOAM EU Group´s economy with EWEA’s from their annual report publications. 
We have been looking at the economy provided by IFOAM EU. From the data provided by 
their official website, it is told that they had a total income of 1,290,605.00 Euros anno 
2014 (IFOAM EU Annual Report 2014). The expenditures of that same year was 
1,210,505 Euros. Of the total expenditures, sixty percent is used on salaries and related. 
We must consider these expenditures as money used on lobbyism, salaries to lobbyist and 
experts. Sixty percent of 1,210,505 Euros is 726,303 Euros total on lobbyist work, that 
alone being pure lobbyist work and not rent and other insignificant expenditures. Though 
to make a fair comparison with EWEAs budget given from European Transparency 
Register, the figures for IFOAM EU 2014 is >= 1.250.000 Euros and < 1.499.999 Euros 
(Ec.europa.eu). 
EWEA has not published their economy in the same way as IFOAM EU. Due to the 
European Transparency Register, it is possible to find the economic expenditures 
information online. In year 2014 money spend by activities included in the register the 
amount is >= 3.000.000 Euros and < 3.249.999 Euros (Ec.europa.eu). 
We observe that the European Wind and Energy Association spends more than double the 
amount of resources on lobbying compared to that spent by the IFOAM EU Group.  
        Third, group size theory could serve as explanatory factor when observing the 
different sizes of the two interest groups. As mentioned, the IFOAM EU Group consists of 
approximately 186.000 organic farmers, which are individual producers. The EWEA on the 
other hand, only consists of 15 wind turbine producers. The theory states that smaller 
interest groups may have an advantage in overcoming collective action problems since 
they have more concentrated advantages. 
As mentioned, the IFOAM EU group have around 300 members in the EU representing 
various organic groups. Arguably the rent/aid they have sought through EU interventions in 
the market have been dispersed over different areas in comparison to that of the wind 
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turbine industry which only have had representation of these above mentioned 15 
producers. 
        In our attempt to answer our research question: To what degree are the organic 
farmers´ interest groups in the European Union able to create political pressure?  We have 
at this point utilized rational choice theory under our theory new institutionalism on the 
comparative case study by Gert Tinggaard Svendsen of Aarhus University. Although 
referring to the author, and including part of his theoretical framework we have supplied 
our own gathered empirical material and worked with a different hypothesis. To further 
legitimize the usefulness of the comparative case study we will add depth to the analysis 
by applying our other theoretical concept path dependence 
One observes different subsidizing from the EU to the two upcoming industries. The wind 
turbines receives a fair larger amount of political support than organic farming, despite the 
latter having more members as an interest group. The author analyzes one of the reasons 
as being that the EU have a 2020 target plan in regards to renewable energy whereas it is 
up to the member state to facilitate its future for organic farming. 
One can utilize rational choice as an explanation. The first argument is simply that wind 
turbines is considered a better business, and politicians being rational calculating actors 
will support this. The second argument is about group size. The argument is that smaller 
groups, in this case the wind turbine interest group, will have it easier organizing 
themselves on achieving concentrated advantages, instead of larger groups who will 
pursue more dispersed help from politicians. The author sees this as a logical explanation 
although deeming it tentative and having to be proven several times in the future. He 
besides mentions a counter argument as to why ecological farmers are doing poorly. That 
being that traditional farmers see them as a threat and that the possibility of counter 
lobbying, although being highly non-transparent exists. 
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5.3 Policy network on comparative case study 
The project has now introduced the comparative case on the organic farmers and the wind 
turbine industry, where the EU transparency register has been implemented in order to be 
aware of is lobbying and which agendas the different interest organization has in regards 
to influence policies. This section analyses these organizations from the perspective of the 
earlier introduced concept of policymaking. 
 
As earlier stated the existence of policy network within policy areas can explain why 
certain groups benefits from resisting pressure for radical reforms, and thereby explain the 
absence of fundamental change within reforms (Daugbjerg, 1999). The interesting aspect 
of the lack of fundamental changes in regards to the organic farmer’s organization is that 
even though the aforementioned organic farming organization IFOAM EU Group is argued 
as being the largest organic farming organization; they experience pressure from the 
conventional farmer organization COPA-COGECA (Svendsen, 2011). COPA-COGECA, 
which is the largest lobby organization in context to agriculture, argued critically against 
the European Union’s environmental target for the 2013 CAP reform. Though COPA-
COGECA is not against farmers delivering more environmental services, they believe that 
these initiatives undermines the farmers’ ability, when it comes to an increase in 
production, which thereby will lead to higher food prices (Phillip, 2012). COPA-COGECA 
argues that food security and stability should be the premise of the CAP reform and that 
the environmental targets will have negative effects on the European farmers (Phillip, 
2012). With this in mind, COPA-COGECA argues that their organization should be the 
interest group to promote organic farming (Svendsen, 2011). As said COPA-COGECA is 
the largest interest group in regards to agriculture within the EU, it is therefore interesting 
to look at this organizations power outflow. The power outflow is measured by the power 
outflow from an actor, which depends on the interest to influence resources and measures 
the policy decision (Henning, 2009). The power outflow thereby measures the amount of 
access the interest groups have in context to politicians and decision influence (Henning, 
2009). Therefore, when examining COPA-COGECAs power outflow within the commission 
in 2009, COPA-COGECA has a 16 percent power outflow compared to the overall power 
outflow within the commission in regards to farmers organization, which is 38 percent 
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(Henning, 2009). COPA-COGECA therefore has 42 percent of the overall power outflow 
from farmers organization. One could therefore argue that while COPA-COGECA being 
the largest interest group on agriculture and mainly represents conventional farmer’s 
interest they aim to keep status quo in regards to policy influence and thereby sees the 
organic farmer’s organization such as IFOAM EU group as a competitor in regards to 
policy influence (Svendsen, 2011). This could therefore be one reason why COPA-
COGECA views organic farming as a supplement to conventional farming and encourages 
the Commission to “establish producer organizations for organic farming at the EU level” 
(Svendsen, 2011). This project would argue that one aspect of COPA-COGECAs 
involvement in organic farming would be to continue the status quo of its influence within 
the institutions of EU.   
       We argue that COPA-COGECA has created a larger policy network than the organic 
farming organization IFOAM EU Group, which has made it difficult for the organic farmers 
organization to influence the policies and to create binding targets for the European 
member states such as it has been done within the case on the wind turbine industry, 
where clear target on alternative resources have been made (Svendsen, 2011). The 
project does not state that COPA-COGECA is not an organization representing organic 
farmers’ interest, which they do. They have to be seen as an organization representing all 
farmers’ interest as well as organic farmers. When being an organization representing all 
aspects of the agricultural industry smaller voices have to an extent more difficulty to be 
heard and represented (Moschitz and Stolze, 2007). 
        As argued earlier in the section “ 5.1 Policy networks comparison”, a significant 
difference is seen between   IFOAM EU and COPA-COGECAs resources, when it comes 
to the budget. As stated COPA-COGECAs budget is >= 2.750.000 euros and < 3.250.000 
whereas IFOAM EU has a budget on 1.290.605 (Ec.europa.eu) (IFOAM EU Annual Report 
2014). The distribution of resources is therefore an interesting aspect, and makes a clear 
distinction between the economic levels in which these organizations operate. Another 
significant aspect to obtain influence within the institutions of the EU is the aforementioned 
ability to be represented at the European level. When examining the European 
transparency register IFOAM EU does not have any representing them at a higher level 
within the Commission as well as within the consultative committee. IFOAM EU is only 
represented in the expert groups of the European Commission (Ec.europa.eu). COPA-
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COGECA on the other hand has active participation on one area at the high level group of 
the Commission and is represented in 17 areas in the consultative committees, where they 
are actively participating (Ec.europa.eu). COPA-COGECA is also active participating as an 
interest group for the Parliament, where IFOAM EU has no representation as an interest 
group (Ec.europa.eu). The difference of the active participation at the European level 
within both the Commission and the Parliament illuminates the efficiency of policy 
networking within the two interest groups. The difference of representation that occurs 
between IFOAM EU and COPA-COGECA could be explained by different factors. One 
factor would be that COPA-COGECA is an interest group which goal is to represent all 
farmers within the EU, and therefore has to be represented in many aspects in connection 
to agriculture. IFOAM is an organic farmer’s organization and may thereby not be 
represented within as many aspects of agriculture. Another factor could be argued as the 
different available resources the two interest groups possess, were COPA-COGECA has 
larger economical resources than IFOAM. From this economic standpoint, COPA-
COGECA has better potential for lobbying and more resources to exchange within the 
policy network. IFOAM EUs exchanges possibilities of resources would therefore be 
limited in context to the larger agricultural interest organization especially COPA-
COGECA, which has develop a strong policy network. A third factor on the representation 
at the EU level states even though COPA-COGECA is stronger represented within the EU 
level they have not received financial funding within the most recent financial period from 
the EU institutions, where IFOAM has received 671,479 Euros in regards to advising on 
sustainability and organic areas of agriculture in 2014 (Ec.europa.eu). 
        Both IFOAM and COPA-COGECA is represented at a European level on areas within 
the agricultural scene. As argued, there is a significant difference on the amount of political 
influence between the two interest groups. COPA-COGECA has larger resources and 
funding which can be argued to strengthen their position within policy networks. COPA-
COGECA is also actively participating on more areas on agriculture at the European level 
than IFOAM. These findings will therefore allow the project to state that there are certain 
difficulties for organic farming organizations to obtain influence on the European level 
compared to the conventional farming organizations. It is important to state that COPA-
COGECA also represent organic farmers, but as stated earlier in the paper COPA-
COGECA does not priorities the organic aspect of agriculture at the same level as they do 
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in regards to conventional farming. There is therefore a significant difference in order for 
the organic farmers’ organization to influence the EU institutions compared to the 
conventional farmers’ organizations. 
       The case on the difference within influence on European policies between organic 
farmers’ organizations and the wind turbine industry organizations will in the next section 
be analyzed by applying the concept of path dependency in order to explain the 
differences on these two areas within the EU.             
5.4 Path dependence on comparative case study 
The project has elaborated on the theoretical concept of path dependence and how path 
dependence can be a tool in order to analyze institutions of the EU and the institutions 
influence on policies. This section uses the concept of path dependence in order to explain 
how the EU institutions have a central part in context to the case on the wind turbine 
industry organization and the organic farmers’ organization. It will be explained how the 
institutional setup affects the respective policies in connection to the policies on alternative 
resources and agriculture. 
       A central aspect to the possibility of influencing the policy within the EU institutions, 
when examining the wind turbine industry and organic farming, is the development of the 
two organizations EWEA and IFOAM EU. EWEA was founded in 1982 where IFOAM was 
founded in 2000 (Svendsen, 2011). An important element of the development of these two 
organizations is that CAP was implemented in 1962 (Cini and Borragán, 2013 pg. 2013). 
From the perspective of the concept of path dependence in connection to the institution of 
CAP, the project would argue that there would be certain difficulties for newer developed 
interest organization such as IFOAM EU to gain influence. The argumentation for this 
postulation is, when applying path dependence on CAP as stated in the section “The 
development of CAP” that the early developments has become embedded in the political 
environment and has affected the political and economic decisions. Therefore, the 
argument for IFOAM EUs greater difficulties to influence CAP would be that COPA-
COGECA has become an essential part of the bureaucratic functioning of the CAP system 
(Key, 2003). This relates to the previous section, which stated that COPA-COGECA 
possess 42 percent of the overall power outflow within the Commission in regards to 
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agricultural farmers organizations. Comparing the agricultural policy with the policy on 
renewable energy measurements, the wind turbine industry organization has existed since 
the first created goals within the EU were developed in 1997 with the Amsterdam Treaty 
(Europa.eu). It would therefore be argued that the policies of renewable energy have not 
been affected by path dependency in the same way CAP has experienced. The wind 
turbine industry organizations would therefore to an extent have greater possibilities to 
create a larger political pressure on the policies within their own policy area. It is also 
argued by Svendsen that the wind turbine producers can achieve great influence within the 
renewable energy policies, because the conventional energy producers support the 
developments of renewable energy (Svendsen, 2011). Not stating that COPA-COGECA 
does not support organic farming. Nevertheless, because CAP has become 
institutionalized new changes to CAP can be difficult as argued by Adrian Kay. Adrian Key 
argues that a system is path dependent when moving in one direction and sticks to the 
same direction in future decisions as mentioned in the section “Path dependency” (Kay, 
2003). 
        The difference between IFOAM and EWEAs possibilities to achieve influence in their 
respective policy areas is the institutionalization of the two areas. The project argues that 
the difference in regards to the implementation of the two policies in connection to the year 
of implementation, have created larger possibilities for EWEA than IFOAM EU in order to 
influence policies. Path dependency has therefore affected IFOAM EUs because of the 
institutionalization of CAP, where EWEA has had possibilities from the first policy in 
context to renewable energy. It could therefore be argued that EWEA just as COPA-
COGECA has become a bureaucratic function within the renewable energy area and 
thereby able to influence policies in a larger manner than IFOAM EUs possibility of 
influence on agriculture.           
        Based on these findings by analysing the empirical evidence of the project by 
applying policy networks and path dependence the project is able to states its concluding 
remarks. The conclusion will follow in the next section, where it will sum up the discovered 
aspect on policy network, path dependency and lobbying within the EU. The object is 
therefore to confirm or refuse the hypothesis of the project in order to answer the problem 
question of the research project: “To what degree are the organic farmers’ interest groups 
in the European Union able to create political pressure?”  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
The research project has now presented different elements concerning path dependence, 
lobbying and policy networks, which have been analyzed from a new institutionalist 
approach in order to answer how historical institutionalism can explain “To what degree 
are the organic farmers’ interest groups in the European Union able to create political 
pressure?” The project has focused on IFOAM EU, the largest organic farmers’ 
organization, and their ability to create political pressure on CAP. The project has therefore 
examined CAP from a historical perspective, because as mentioned in the section “CAP 
as an institution” CAP has been institutionalized. This institutionalization of CAP from the 
perspective of path dependency and historical institutionalism states that history matters, 
where this project argues that past decisions made within the CAP directs future decision 
in the same direction. This aspect of the institutionalization of CAP is essential, when 
examining the political influence of IFOAM EU. Another essential element in order for 
IFOAM EU to gain political influence is the change from consultation to co-decision within 
the decision making of the EU institutions. The project argues that this change of decision-
making has created larger possibilities for organic farmers to achieve political pressure at 
the EU level. Nevertheless, the institutionalization of CAP and the fact that COPA-
COGECA has become a bureaucratic function within the system of CAP creates certain 
difficulties for IFOAM to gain political pressure. 
The project argues that even though COPA-COGECA also represents organic farmers’ 
interest they do not use as many resources as IFOAM on this exact area. COPA-COGECA 
is still represented on more areas at the European level than IFOAM. The project therefore 
argues that COPA-COGECA has a much larger representation within the EU institutions, 
because of the influence of path dependency as well as has created a larger policy 
network, because COPA-COGECA has been a part of the bureaucratic function within the 
system of CAP since an early stage. 
The project is thereby able confirm its hypothesis that that the organic farmers 
organizations (IFOAM EU) has greater difficulties to influence decision making outcomes 
compared to the conventional farmers organizations (COPA-COGECA). This does not 
mean that an organization such as IFOAM EU is not able to achieve political pressure. It 
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states that organic farmers’ organizations are represented at fewer areas at European 
level than conventional farmers and thereby has larger complications to influence policies 
than the conventional farmers. Therefore when answering: “To what degree are the 
organic farmers’ interest groups in the European Union able to create political pressure?” it 
is important to state that an organization such as IFOAM EU are able to achieve political 
pressure. They are though experiencing implications in context to representation at the 
European level, because of the path dependency of the institutionalization of CAP as well 
as the conventional farmers’ organizations pressure to keep status quo. 
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